Dr. David Akopyan, Advisor to the President of Armenia; Former United Nations Development Program Director
Azerbaijan’s “Scrolling Aggression” in Times of Turbulences and Lawlessness in the New World Order
Azerbaijan’s victory in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was merely a turning point. Below the radar of the West, Baku has pursued a “scrolling aggression” — a gradual escalation while avoiding anything dramatic to trigger a Western response. Now Aliyev has his eyes on the Meghri “Corridor,” seen as a critical trade route between its Turkish patron and Central Asia. He knows his military and economic superiority will not last forever and is ready to act before Armenia closes the gap. To counter Azerbaijan’s threats, Armenia should pursue a multi-faceted strategy: accelerate military reforms, strengthen the EU alliance, avoid unnecessary friction with Moscow and Tehran, and enhance economic resilience and defense industrial development.
Dr. Cengiz Aktar, University of Athens, EKPA
Turkey as a Dynamic of Insecurity for Its Neighborhood
Contrary to its traditional pro-Western foreign policy positions, particularly since the end of WWII, Turkey has increasingly opted for a more independent doctrine since the 2010s. In practice this has resulted in assertive, if not aggressive foreign interventions, transforming Turkey into a source of unpredictability, insecurity and constant threat towards its neighbors. Although with mixed results, Ankara stubbornly continues to behave along these lines, also thanks to its “former” allies’ indulgence and appeasement towards its deeds.
Dr. Mustafa Aydin, Professor of International Relations, Kadir Has University, Istanbul
Impact of Global and Regional Changes on Caucasian Geopolitics
Global politics has been passing through a long-term systemic change, the end of which is not yet seen. Russia’s long-term challenge to international principles, U.S. President Trump’s recent disruptive moves, various global re-alignments, and diverse regional developments have recently impacted Caucasian geopolitics and forced regional countries and their neighbors to question, yet again, their places in regional and global politics. As the Caucasus is situated on the crossroad between East and West, and North and South, the reverberations of this search will be felt not only by the regional countries and their neighbors but also by Europe and China. As such, this paper will look at the impacts for the geopolitics of the region of the 45-day war over Nagorno-Karabakh and the following peace negotiations, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and continuing war, the gradual shifts in foreign policies of all three Caucasian countries, the recent repositioning of the U.S., Turkey, Iran, and the EU, and China’s growing presence in the Caucasus.
Dr. Shalva Dzebisashvili, Associate Professor, University of Georgia, School of Social Sciences; Chairman of the Board, The Security, Policy & Nationalism Research Center (UGSPN)
South Caucasus – Torn between the European Perspective and the Need for Power (and Economic) Balance
This presentation draws on several parallelly developing dynamics in the South Caucasus region that have the potential of positive convergence or alternatively might increasingly develop into competitive or mutually exclusive processes. Three major factors play a crucial role in this analysis: the perspective of Georgia’s and Armenia’s EU-integration (Europeanization), which requires a clear EU-strategy towards the region; the various projects of regional economic development (Transport/Transit etc.) that might go beyond their regional relevance; and the security dynamics, which significantly influence the entire regional landscape in the context of balance of power.
Ms. Lilit Gevorgyan, Institute for Security Analysis
Decoding the Russian-Azeri nexus in the South Caucasus, and Its Impact on Armenia’s Near Future
Nearly half a decade on since the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, there is a widespread consensus in Armenia, among its diaspora, and the wider international expert and diplomatic community, that the 2020 war and the subsequent fall of Nagorno-Karabakh were the consequences of Russia’s weakness and distraction by the Ukrainian crisis. There is a widely shared view that in recent years Russia retreated from the South Caucasus to use its limited resources in Ukraine. Consequently, Azerbaijan, backed by Turkey, has seized upon this weakness to change the balance of power in the South Caucasus, thus reducing Russian influence and increasing its own and Turkish presence. This argument is sometimes augmented by another assumption that weakened Russia chose to build pragmatic relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey, over its commitments to Armenia, and allowed the surrender of Nagorno Karabakh.
Both Armenian and diasporan political circles, and especially Western policymakers, see current Russia-Azerbaijan and Russia-Turkey relations as temporary rapprochements. Many in Armenian political thought leadership expect the restoration of balance of power with Azerbaijan when Russia becomes less distracted by the Ukrainian war and reasserts itself in the South Caucasus. There are even those few who believe that Russia will help to restore Armenia’s territorial integrity and oversee the return of Artsakh Armenians to their homeland.
Equally, many Western policymakers and experts assume that Russia and Turkey, along with its junior strategic partner Azerbaijan, are historic rivals, and in the very near future their relationship of convenience will end or has nearly ended. Many are convinced Turkey, now aided by Azerbaijan, will resume the function of fighting off Russia in the South Caucasus, Ukraine, and even Central Asia. These assumptions are fine examples of the blind spots in understanding Russian foreign policy shifts over the last decade and a half. These commonly held beliefs pose a risk of continued miscalculation when it comes to Armenia’s and indeed foreign policy moves in the South Caucasus.
A closer study of the strategic and tactical shifts in Russia’s foreign policy in the lead-up to the Crimean annexation demonstrates coherent, well-thought-through structural changes in the Russian objectives and mode of operation in the so-called Near Abroad. The research reveals that Azerbaijan has been an ideological partner in this process, and not an opportunistic player of late. The Russian-Azeri nexus is based on a shared strategic vision, and common interests and objectives. Russia and Azerbaijan have cultivated a multilayered and sophisticated partnership for well over a decade. This relationship has also had its own impact on Russia-Turkey relations, moving them from simple rivalry to “competitive partnership.”
The overarching objective of this authoritarian consolidation and qualitatively new level of cooperation has been the establishment of regionalism, or shared control over the regions or countries of interest. The prime target of regionalism is the West, its exclusion from the region’s politics. This objective is gradually and successfully being achieved in the South Caucasus, something that would not have been possible without the Russian-Azeri nexus. The research is focusing on the key events when the strategic shifts in Russian foreign policy took place and on the latter’s evolution. It refutes the above-mentioned consensus view of Russia-Azerbaijan relations. It invites these experts to explore the serious risks to Armenian statehood stemming from the rising regionalism and its repeated endorsement by the current Armenian authorities.
Mr. Richard Giragosian, Director, Regional Studies Center, Yerevan
Redefining Armenia’s Post-War Security Strategy
Faced with a daunting set of diverse threats and challenges, Armenia struggles to reassert its independence through a difficult post-war degree of weakness and loss. Yet, Armenia has adapted to these challenges through the adoption of an innovative strategy of “diversification,” seeking to broaden its security partners while bolstering its strategic significance. Despite this difficult strategic readjustment, however, Armenia must still overcome a period of profound shifts in regional and global geopolitics.
Dr. Altay Goyushov, Invited Research Fellow,CERI/Sciences Po., Paris
Domestication of Islam: Azerbaijan’s Policy to Curb Foreign Influence
Since the late 1980s the decline of Soviet anti-religious policies led to an Islamic revival, which unfolded in an unregulated, chaotic, and largely foreign-driven manner. Between 1988 and 1993, Azerbaijan experienced an unprecedented level of freedom compared to the previous totalitarian communist rule. A highly liberal Law on Religious Freedom was adopted in 1992. However, in 1993, the former Soviet leader Heydar Aliyev of Azerbaijan returned to power. Following the 1994 ceasefire in the First Karabakh War, the government shifted its focus toward addressing the unchecked religious developments in the country. This presentation aims to examine and analyze the evolution of government policies toward Islam over the past decade.
Dr. Nzhdeh Hovsepyan, Director, Radar Armenia News Agency
Captives of the Status Quo: Armenia-Azerbaijan Normalization Process After the Second Karabakh War
The Armenia-Azerbaijan normalization remains in stagnation after the Second Karabakh War, with both countries navigating a fragile post-war landscape. While the relations between external geopolitical actors shape the region’s dynamics, Armenia and Azerbaijan themselves periodically seek to utilize external factors to shift political responsibility away from themselves. Bilateral relations are increasingly influenced by broader geopolitical interests rather than the local grievances of the conflicting parties. Following its complete seizure of Karabakh, Azerbaijan has intensified this strategy, leveraging external engagement to bolster its position while publicly advocating for bilateral normalization — despite avoiding full accountability for the process and the prioritization of peace. The regional triangle of Russia, Iran, and Turkey, alongside the omnipresent influence of the EU and the U.S., has transformed Armenia-Azerbaijan normalization into an issue that extends beyond bilateral constraints. This situation mirrors patterns observed after the First Karabakh War, though with key roles now reversed. Even though the geopolitics has changed a lot, which resulted also from the shifting power asymmetries and security dilemmas in the region, Armenia-Azerbaijan normalization is still in a deadlock. Neither side appears willing or prepared to expend the necessary political capital to break the impasse. As a result, the status quo persists, leaving the door open for further deterioration of relations or even military escalation.
Dr. Alexander Iskandaryan, Director,Caucasus Institute, Yerevan
Russia in the South Caucasus: A New Architecture
Russia’s policies vis-à-vis the South Caucasus changed dramatically in the last few years. For example, a decade ago, it would have been hard to imagine that our region would experience the deportation of a hundred thousand civilians in the presence of Russian peacekeepers in charge of protecting them. It isn’t just the security architecture that has changed, but, as it were, the anthropology of the relations. The changes are anything but random. This makes one wonder about the trend that they reflect: does it stem from the general context, or from something more profound? Has it passed the point of no return? The presentation will suggest answers to these and similar questions.
Dr. Stephen Jones, Senior Researcher, Program on Georgian Studies, Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University; Professor of Georgian Modern History,Ilia State University, Georgia
Regional Cooperation in the Caucasus: Lessons From the Past
In 1917-18, there were several attempts at regional cooperation between Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Georgian political leaders. Such cooperation underwent several institutional transformations, culminating in the creation of the Transcaucasian Democratic Federal Republic on 22 April,1918. It lasted only one month. Between 1918-1921, the three independent republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, despite agreements over trade and territory, remained largely hostile to one another. This led to a decline in Western interest and greater vulnerability to external intervention (Russia and Turkey). Despite unsuccessful attempts at unity during 1918-21 and the significant differences in the challenges faced then and now, are there lessons we can learn from this time in South Caucasian history? Can we adapt any of the more positive ideas, frameworks, or policies from 1918-21 to the conditions South Caucasian states face today?
Dr. Ahmad Kazemi, Professor of International Law, Faculty of Law, Islamic Azad University, Central Tehran Branch
Fields of Cooperation Between Iran and Europe in the South Caucasus After the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Iran was one of the first countries to recognize the declaration of independence of the three South Caucasus countries. Since the beginning of the independence of the Caucasus countries, there have been crises such as the ones in Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. Iran, in accordance with the UN Charter and the peremptory rules of international law, emphasized several legal principles that today also constitute Iran’s principled policy in the Caucasus, including: supporting the territorial integrity of countries, emphasizing the inviolability of international borders and the peaceful resolution of disputes through the solutions set out in Article 33 of the UN Charter, ensuring the security and rights of ethnic minorities in the Caucasus, preventing the Caucasus from becoming a place of competition between great powers, and localizing security in this region. Given the shifting balance of power in the Caucasus and the efforts of Ankara, Baku, and some powers to create geopolitical changes and dismember Armenia, it seems that Iran and some European countries, including France, have common interests in cooperation in the Caucasus. Tehran has also emphasized the need to depoliticize transit and energy issues in the region and has proposed the “Aras Corridor” to connect the Republic of Azerbaijan to Nakhichevan, which is in some ways complementary to Armenia’s “Crossroads of Peace” plan.
Dr. Nerses Kopalyan, Associate Professor-in-Residence, Department of Political Science; Undergraduate Engagement Coordinator, University of Nevada, Las Vegas
A Strategic Porcupine With a Western Flair: Armenia’s New Foreign and Security Doctrine
Situating Armenia’s foreign and security pivot away from the decades-old Russian security architecture has produced geostructural and systemic shifts in Armenia’s engagements both in the region and at the international level. The causal basis upon which this pivot developed, and the empirical grounds upon which it has been operationalized, offer a unique trajectory in understanding Armenia’s endeavor of developing a new security architecture that is defined by a two-tiered deterrence model, as well the adoption of a comprehensive security strategy commensurate with the needs of a democratizing small state. The restructuring of Armenia’s security architecture is situated between its power asymmetry with Azerbaijan and its decoupling from Russia, which the findings in this research show as mitigating, yet manageable obstacles, in consolidating and strengthening Armenia’s underlying objective of being a strategic “porcupine” with a Western flair.
Mr. Achal Malhotra, Former India’s Ambassador to the Republic of Armenia; Managing Editor,Indian Foreign Affairs Journal
The South Caucasus: A View From India
In this brief paper I analyze the evolution of India’s relations with the three constituent countries of the South Caucasus during the past three decades and figure out in the process as to why India has not been able to adopt a pan-South Caucasus policy for the region, which it views as one which has witnessed never-ending tug of war amongst global players for control/influence and also as one of the least integrated regions despite geographic contiguity. Finally, I put forth what the Indians, familiar with the region, think about the current scenario and future prospects, while adding the recommended approaches.
Mr. Arman Melikyan, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of the Republic of Armenia; Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh
The Local Conflicts and the Global Changes
A process of global balance transformation started at the beginning of the 21st century and has evolved through several stages since then. This process was initiated by a small group of states. For some of them, the main goal was the preservation of their global dominance; for others, attaining higher levels of regional security and securing better new political, military and economic opportunities. In this context, the war in Ukraine separated the EU countries from Russia and thus cut the routes across Russian territory for transiting goods from and to China. This means that the Chinese “One Belt One Road” project can be endangered if some conflicts also appear along its southern branch. In such a case, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Southern Caucasus could be their loci. In turn, in addition to regional instability, a deep transportation crisis could result from such crises.
Mr. Zohrab Mnatsakanyan, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia
Armenia in Global and Regional Power Competition
Power determined by size, population, economic and military strength determines a priori the vulnerabilities of smaller states. The interpretation and adaptation of power to strategic objectives for a small state should be expected to lead to a strategic vision for constructing and developing its own capacities for shock absorption and moderation of great power competition, globally or regionally. It should enable the capacity for generating its own role in balancing power competition, a shared interest among stronger powers in the existence and equidistance of the smaller state, and signify a distinct role for the latter in becoming valuable to big competitors. Pursuit of such strategic vision should be expected to lead to defining, as well as practically and pragmatically constructing the power of the smaller state.
Armenia’s biggest challenge is to address and change the mindset of dependency on one country, block of countries or regions for security. It needs a truly rational, realist and pragmatic approach, at the heart of which is a consistent development of national capacities to sustain a nation-state, a capacity to defend the state and its national and political identities, pragmatic engagements at the regional level, based on the principle of equidistance, as much as at the use of value based relations with like-minded nations to mitigate security risks.
Dr. Anna Ohanyan, Richard B. Finnegan Professor of International Relations, Stonehill College; Nonresident Senior Scholar, Russia and Eurasia Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
South Caucasus: Garrison or a Gateway in the Eurasian Continent, and the Stakes for the U.S.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has profoundly altered Eurasia’s geopolitical landscape, accelerating Russia’s decline as a strategic hub in the global economy. It has disrupted transcontinental trade and weakened Russia’s leverage over Eurasian connectivity — both infrastructural and political. In parallel, the U.S. power projection in the Eurasian continent has remained driven by alliance politics, with mixed results for democratic consolidation and regional security in the broader Eurasian continent. Albeit seemingly transactional, the Trump pivot to Russia creates risks and rewards for the South Caucasus. Will the South Caucasus remain a Eurasian garrison or will it manage to become a gateway of Eurasian connectivity?
Mr. Yeghia Tashjian, Regional and International Affairs Cluster Coordinator, the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, American University of Beirut
Navigating Along the Mines: Regional Corridorization and Armenia’s Foreign Policy Choices
Throughout history, empires and kingdoms have used corridors and transit routes to exert their influence over neighboring regions. The 21st century has witnessed global competition on major trade routes in Eurasia triggering major actors to pursue their geopolitical and geo-economic interests at the expense of small states. This competition, which facilitated interconnectivity, helped small states such as Armenia to diversify their trade networks, but at the same time limited its maneuvering space and compromised its sovereignty. In this analysis, the roles of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and the Middle Corridors (MC) will be analyzed and compared to the Armenia-initiated “Crossroads of Peace.” The paper will identify and analyze Armenia’s foreign policy choices amid Eurasian corridorization, highlight the risks and challenges, and propose recommendations.
Dr. Vahram Ter-Matevosyan, Professor, Interim Associate Dean, American University of Armenia
Institutionalization of Revenge: Understanding Azerbaijan’s Assertiveness vis-à-vis Armenia and Artsakh Between 2020 and 2023
Explanatory frameworks concerning Azerbaijan’s military assertiveness against Armenia and Artsakh have primarily revolved around hard power-based realist propensities. Although useful, the boundaries and meaning of these interpretations downplay the importance of revenge as a conceptual, ideational, and mobilizational driver. Operationalization of the phenomenon of revenge in international conflicts can serve as an additional level of analysis in explaining Azerbaijan’s coercive stance against Armenia and Artsakh. Drawing on the theoretical framework developed in 2008 by Lowenheim and Heimann, the paper examines the instrumental utility and limitations of revenge in explaining Azerbaijan’s institutional practices and strategic choices against Armenia and Artsakh.
Dr. Marat Terterov, Founding Partner, European Geopolitical Forum, Brussels
Optimizing European Engagement in the South Caucasus for the Enhancement of Regional Stability and Prosperity
The South Caucasus is a region of the world which has seen its fair share of geopolitical challenges, if not outright conflict, since the end of the Cold War. The three states of the region — Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia — have often been compelled to engage in geopolitical pivoting: choosing between Russia or the West as a means of assuring their security and ultimately the survival of their statehood. While the EU has engaged the region through various neighborhood policy instruments, Brussels’ inexorable promotion of its values-based programs into the South Caucasus can also be seen as geopolitics in disguise. This is especially the case from a Russian perspective towards the region, precipitating regional geopolitical competition and heaping pressure on all three South Caucasus countries. Is it not high time for external actors engaging in the region, the EU included, to change track and focus on economic policy as their primary means of promoting regional peace and prosperity?
Ms. Olesya Vartanyan, Regional Expert on Security and Conflicts in the South Caucasus
Russia’s Role in South Caucasus Conflicts: Peacekeeper, Powerbroker, or Declining Hegemon?
Russia has long positioned itself as the primary arbiter of conflicts in the South Caucasus, deploying peacekeepers, mediating ceasefires, and leveraging its influence over breakaway regions. This presentation will analyze Russia’s handling of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in its latest phase, comparing it with its role in Georgia’s breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It will examine how Moscow’s approach has evolved amid shifting regional and global dynamics, the challenges it faces in maintaining its authority, and the lasting impact of its conflict management strategies on the region’s stability.
Dr. Zheng Yuntian, Professor; Assistant Director,Belt and Road Initiative Research Center, Renmin University of China
Condition, Issues, and Features on South Caucasian Studies of Chinese Academia
Historically, South Caucasian studies in China used to be included in Russian and Central Asian studies. In recent years, the geopolitical significance of the South Caucasus has been increasing as it came to be regarded as a post-Soviet space, thus much more independent and specific academic outcomes have been appearing. This presentation will have three parts: first, it will introduce the conditions of South Caucasian studies in China, mainly focusing on research papers from the CNKI database; second, it will classify the issues of these academic outcomes, such as security, trade, culture and so on; third, it will analyze some typical features of South Caucasian studies in China. To sum up, this research domain is full of potential and vitality in the changing world order.